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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SERGIO LLAMAS RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20040863-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal, with prejudice, of his petition for relief
under the Postconviction Remedies Act (PCRA) challenging his guilty plea to one count
of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. R. 2, 242. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
la. Assuming that the PCRA's "interests of justice" exception would be satisfied
if petitioner could show that he was entitled to the benefit of a new rule of constitutional
law, announced after his case became final: did this Court announce a new rule in State
v. Rojas-Martinez, by adopting the "commonly recognized" principle that counsel
performs deficiently by affirmatively misrepresenting the deportation consequences of a
guilty plea?

lb. Did petitioner's counsel affirmatively misrepresent the deportation
consequences of petitioner's plea by stating that petitioner "'might be deported' but that
[counsel] was not sure"?
2. Should this Court consider whether the PCRA's "interests of justice" exception
is satisfied by the allegation of a meritorious claim, when petitioner provides no
applicable authority or analysis to support that interpretation?
Standard of Review for issues la, lb, and 2. This Court will "review an appeal
from an order dismissing or denying petition for post-conviction relief for correctness
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002
UT7,^j4,43P.3d467.
3a. Should this Court consider petitioner's request for a new rule of constitutional
law, requiring counsel to always advise of the deportation consequences of a plea, when
that claim is unpreserved and petitioner fails to argue that any exception to the
preservation rule applies?
3b. Can a petitioner ask a court to announce a new rule of constitutional law in a
postconviction proceeding when the PCRA does not allow a petitioner to seek relief on
that ground?
3 c. If this Court reaches the merits of this claim, should it overrule its holding in
State v. McFadden and adopt the minority rule?
Standard of Review for issues 3a-3c. Because these issues were not preserved
below, no standard of review applies.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following relevant constitutional provision and statutes is
reproduced in Addendum A:
U.S. CONST, amend. VI
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104 (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (West 2004)
CASE AND FACT STATEMENT
Petitioner Pleads Guilty in the Underlying Criminal Case
On 28 May 1998 the State charged petitioner with one count of sexual abuse of a
child, a second degree felony. R. 164-65. On 30 June 1999 petitioner pled guilty to a
reduced charge of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony. R. 166-72.
Petitioner was represented by Jorge H. Galvez. R. 168.
On 29 July 1999 petitioner, through Mr. Galvez, filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. R. 173-74. Petitioner then retained new counsel, Mr. Robert M. Archuleta.
R. 176. On 30 August 1999 Mr. Archuleta filed a second motion to withdraw petitioner's
guilty plea. R. 178-87. The motion alleged that Mr. Galvez was ineffective because he
failed to investigate certain witnesses. R. 178-79. It also alleged that petitioner was
unprepared to enter his plea because he anticipated that the proceeding would only be a
pre-trial conference, not a plea hearing. R. 179.
On 8 November 1999 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, R. 188, and denied the motion. R. 194.
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Petitioner Requests an Early Release So the INS Can Deport Him to Mexico
On 14 February 2000 the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 196. During
that hearing, Mr. Archuleta addressed the immigration consequences of petitioner's plea.
R. 147-48. Mr. Archuleta informed the trial court that he had consulted an immigration
attorney regarding the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea. R. 147. Mr.
Archuleta reported that petitioner had pled guilty to an "aggravated felony" as defined by
federal immigration law and would therefore be deported and barred from reentering the
United States. R. 147. In light of these consequences, Mr. Archuleta requested the trial
court to grant petitioner an early release so the INS could deport him and he could begin
rebuilding his life in Mexico. R. 147.
The trial court sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years
at the Utah State Prison. R. 196, 198. However, the trial court suspended the prison
sentence and placed petitioner on probation on several conditions, including that
petitioner serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 197, 198. The trial court also
ordered that petitioner could "be released early to [INS]." R. 148, 197, 198.
The judgment and sentence was entered 14 February 2000. R. 198. Petitioner did
not appeal.
The Petition for Postconviction Relief
Sometime after he was deported, petitioner illegally reentered the United States
and was convicted in federal court of aggravated re-entry of a previously removed alien.
Aplt Br. at 46.
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On 13 May 2004 Petitioner filed a petition for relief under the PCRA. R. 1-7.
Relying on this Court's decision in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d
967, cert granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah 2003), petitioner claimed that Mr. Galvez was
ineffective because he had affirmatively misrepresented the deportation consequences of
petitioner's guilty plea. R. 6, 26-28. Petitioner's affidavit asserted that Mr. Galvez told
him that "that [he] 'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure." R. 33.
Petitioner argued that his petition was timely because it was filed less than one year after
Rojas-Martinez was issued. R. 29-30.
The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year
statute oflimitations,UTAHCODEANN. §78-35a-107 (West 2004). R. 199-200. The
State argued that although the PCRA's statute of limitations provides that a cause of
action does not accrue until "the date on which petition knew or should have known ... of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based," id. at 78-35a-107(2)(e), the decision in
Rojas-Martinez was not an "evidentiary fact" on which the petition was based. R. 14950. In other words, because petitioner's theory was based on newly discovered law, and
not newly discovered evidence, the PCRA's discovery rule did not render his petition
timely. R. 149-50.
Nevertheless, the State conceded that the interests of justice exception to the
PCRA's statute of limitations would be satisfied if petitioner could demonstrate that
Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of constitutional law. R. 150. However, the State
argued that Rojas-Martinez did not do so. R. 150-52.
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The postconviction court granted the State's motion and dismissed the petition
with prejudice. R. 239-42 (a copy of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
dismissing the petition is attached as Addendum B). The postconviction court agreed
that Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule, and therefore petitioner had failed to
satisfy the interests of justice exception. R. 241. The postconviction court also found
that even if Rojas-Martinez was a new rule, petitioner had not alleged a violation of that
rule. R. 241. The postconviction court concluded that counsel's advice that petitioner
"'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure," did not affirmatively misrepresent
the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea. R. 241.
Petitioner timely appealed. R. 235.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The postconviction court correctly held that petitioner had not satisfied the
interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations. To do so, petitioner
had to demonstrate that State v. Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of law. RojasMartinez did not announce a new rule because it was based on an ineffective assistance
of counsel analysis, which examines counsel's perspective at the time of the challenged
conduct. Furthermore, this Court recognized that it merely adopted a "commonly
recognized" exception that counsel performs deficiently by affirmatively misrepresenting
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. However, even assuming that RojasMartinez announced a new rule, petitioner failed to allege a violation of that rule. Nor
can he demonstrate prejudice.
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II. Petitioner's second claim is unpreserved and this Court should refuse to reach
it because he does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule should apply.
Petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that this Court should overrule its holding in
State v. McFadden, and adopt a new rule requiring counsel to always advise a defendant
of the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Petitioner did not argue below
that the postconviction court should reject McFadden. Rather, petitioner relied on RojasMartinez to claim that he was entitled to relief because his counsel affirmatively
misrepresented the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.
Even if petitioner raised this claim below, this Court should not consider it
because petitioner cannot seek the announcement of a new rule of constitutional law in a
proceeding under the PCRA. In any event, petitioner's proposed new rule fails on its
merits. Petitioner has not demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent
and adopt the minority rule he proposes. Nor can petitioner demonstrate prejudice under
his new rule.
III. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Utah Supreme Court's opinions in
Julian v. State and Frausto v. State establish that the "interests of justice" exception to
the PCRA's statute of limitations is satisfied when a petitioner alleges a meritorious
claim. Neither Julian nor Frausto interpreted the PCRA's statute of limitations.
Petitioner offers no other analysis or authority to support his proposed interpretation of
the "interests of justice" exception. Therefore, this Court should refuse to consider his
claim. In any event, petitioner failed to allege any meritorious claim. Thus, even under
his interpretation, the "interests of justice" exception was not satisfied.
7

ARGUMENT
Introduction
In his first issue, petitioner urges this Court to adopt, for the first time in this
appeal from a collateral postconviction proceeding, a new rule of constitutional law and
apply it retroactively to him. Aplt. Br. at 9-32. Because petitioner did not raise this issue
below and the postconviction court did not address it, the State addresses this claim in
Point II of this brief.
In his second issue, petitioner contends that the postconviction court erroneously
rejected the issue that he did raise below: that he satisfied the interests of justice
exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations because this Court's decision in RojasMartinez announced a new rule of law that should apply retroactively to him. Aplt. Br. at
32-45. The State addresses this issue in Point I of this brief.
This Court should also note that although this case presents complex procedural
issues, this case could be easily resolved on its merits. Even assuming that petitioner
could surmount the numerous procedural hurdles that prevent this Court from reaching
the merits of his claims, those claims fail for lack of prejudice.
"'"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel, he or she must show a "'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.55'"
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 22, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
525 (Utah 1994) (in turn quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, (1985) (alteration in
original)).
8

Petitioner avers in his petition and affidavit that had he known that his guilty plea
would result in deportation, he would have insisted on going to trial. R. 34. However,
the record of his criminal case conclusively disproves his assertion.
Following his guilty plea, petitioner hired new counsel and filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea based on prior counsel's ineffectiveness. R. 176, 178-87. New
counsel understood that petitioner had pled guilty to a crime that would render him
deportable. R. 147. Nevertheless, petitioner never moved to withdraw his plea on the
ground that prior counsel had misadvised him of the deportation consequences of his
plea. R. 178-87. On the contrary, petitioner acknowledged that his plea rendered him
deportable and asked the trial court to grant him an early release so that the INS could
deport him and he could begin rebuilding his life in Mexico. R. 147.
On this record, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial." Dean, 2004 UT 63, at f 22 (quotations and citations omitted). Knowing that he
would be deported, petitioner never sought to withdraw his plea on that basis, and even
requested that the trial court facilitate his deportation. R. 147. Therefore, petitioner
cannot demonstrate prejudice under either Rojas-Martinez, or the new rule he proposes.
See Dean, 2004 UT 63 at f 22. Consequently, both of petitioner's claim ultimately fail
on their merits.

9

I. PETITIONER DID NOT SATISFY THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE EXCEPTION BECAUSE ROJAS-MARTINEZ DID NOT
ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
ALTERNATIVELY, PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE UNDER ROJASIVLiRTINEZ
Under the PCRA's statute of limitations, petitioner was required to file his petition
"within one year after the cause of action has accrued." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a107(1). Because petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence, his cause of action
accrued on "the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction." Id at 78-35a-107(2)(a).
Petitioner was sentenced 14 February 2000. R. 240. Because 2000 was a leap
year, the last day that petitioner could have filed a notice of appeal would have been 15
March 2000. R. 240. Petitioner's postconviction cause of action accrued on 15 March
2000 and expired on 15 March 2001. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(a).
Petitioner filed his petition on 13 May 2004. R. 240. Therefore, his petition was
untimely. See § 78-35a-107(l).
Petitioner argued below that his petition was timely because he had filed it within
one year of this Court's decision in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 2035 73 P.3d
967, cert granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Utah 2003), holding that trial counsel performs
deficiently if he affirmatively misrepresents the deportation consequences of a guilty
plea. R. 29-30. Petitioner misinterpreted the PCRA's statute of limitations.
The PCRA's statute of limitations does contain a discovery rule, providing that a
claim does not accrue until "the date on which petition knew or should have known ... of
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evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(e).
However, the decision in Rojas-Martinez was not an "evidentiary fact" on which the
petition was based. Therefore, the State argued below that the petition could not be
timely merely because it was filed within one year of Rojas-Martinez, R. 149-50.
Nevertheless, the State also acknowledged below that the interests of justice exception to
the PCRA's statute of limitations would be satisfied if petitioner could demonstrate that
Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of constitutional law. R. 150.
The PCRA's statute of limitations does not explicitly provide that a petition
seeking the benefit of a new rule of constitutional law is timely if it is filed within one
year of the decision announcing the new rule. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2).
However, it does provide that "a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the
time limitations" if the court finds "that the interests of justice require." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-107(3). The interests of justice exception would be satisfied if petitioner
could demonstrate that a case, decided after his conviction became final, announced a
new rule of constitutional law that should apply retroactively.
The interests of justice exception should apply in such a situation, because a
petitioner should be able to obtain the benefit of a new retroactive rule of constitutional
law regardless of how much time has elapsed since his conviction became final. Under
the PCRA, a petitioner may obtain relief if his "conviction was obtained or [his] sentence
was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004). It also states that u[t]he question of whether
a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme
11

Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction
became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-104(2). Therefore, if the United States Supreme Court, or a

Utah appellate court, announces a new retroactive rule of constitutional law after a
defendant's conviction becomes final, then that defendant could seek relief under the
PCRA on the ground that his "conviction was obtained ... in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(l)(a).
The PCRA's statute of limitations should never bar such a claim. Therefore, if the
decision announcing a new retroactive rule is issued more than one year after a
defendant's conviction becomes final, then the interests of justice exception should apply.
A. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule.
The interests of justice would not be satisfied when a petitioner seeks the benefit
of a rule that was available when his conviction became final. If a rule was available
when a defendant's conviction became final, then that defendant could have obtained the
benefit of that rule in his trial or appeal, had he raised the issue. Under the PCRA, a
petitioner cannot seek relief based upon a ground that "could have been but was not
raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004).
Therefore, a petitioner cannot base his postconviction claim on a case that simply relies
on an established rule that he also could have relied on at his trial. See id.
Petitioner acknowledges that to proceed on his claim, he must satisfy the interests
of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations. Aplt. Br. at 32-45. He contends
that he has satisfied the exception because Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule of
12

constitutional law that should be retroactively applied to him. Aplt. Br. at 32-45.
However, the postconviction court found that this Court did not announce a new rule. R.
241. The postconviction court was correct.
1. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because the
decision was announced in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
The decision in Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because its holding
was based on ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. When a court analyzes an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it must do so based on the law in effect at the
time. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (U.S. 2003) (explaining that counsel's
challenged conduct must be evaluated '"from counsel's perspective at the time'")
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993) ("To establish a claim of ineffectiveness based on an
oversight... a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law
in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient").
Counsel's performance cannot be deficient, under the first prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel test, unless his conduct "fall[s] below an objective standard of
reasonableness." See Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31,120, 94 P.3d 211 (quotations and
citations omitted). Counsel's failure to comply with a new, not yet announced rule could
never be objectively unreasonable. Cf. Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.
2002) (courts "have rejected ineffective assistance claims where a defendant 'faults his
former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for failing to predict future law'
and have warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective
13

representation'" (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir.
1995)). Therefore, when an issue is analyzed under an ineffective assistance of counsel
analysis, the result of that analysis could never be a new rule.
The Rojas-Martinez opinion illustrates this principle. In that case, this Court
found that counsel's performance was "objectively unreasonable" because counsel failed
to comply with already established legal standards. See 2003 UT App 203 atfflf8-10.
This Court did not fault counsel for failing to satisfy a previously undefined rule. See id.
Therefore, because Rojas-Martinez was decided under an ineffective assistance of
counsel analysis, it did not announce a new rule.
2. Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule because it
applied an established legal standard of general applicability.
Petitioner contends that under federal precedent, Rojas-Martinez announced a new
rule because the rule was not "dictated by prior precedent." Aplt. Br. at 36-40. On the
contrary, federal precedent establishes that Rojas-Martinez's application of Strickland's
well-established and generally applicable ineffective assistance of counsel standard did
not announce a new rule.
When a case involves a rule of general applicability such as the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard, "case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding
... that the rule at issue was dictated by [prior] precedent." Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d
646, 655 (3rd Cir. 2004). "Where the beginning point is a rule of this general application,
a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will
be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not
14

dictated by precedent." Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
For example, in Lewis, the Third Circuit analyzed whether the rule announced in
Roe v. Flores-Ortgea, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), "holding that criminal defense attorneys have
a constitutional duty to consult and advise defendants of their appellate rights," was a
new rule, or whether it was "dictated by precedent clearly established at the time Lewis's
conviction became final." 359 F.3d at 652, 654. The Third Circuit concluded that the
rule "was dictated by precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular
facts of that case." Id. at 655. Therefore, Flores-Ortgea did not announce a new rule.
Id. at 657.
In reaching this holding, the Third Circuit observed that Flores-Ortega applied the
Strickland standard to the question of whether an attorney is deficient for failing to file a
notice of appeal when a defendant gives no specific instructions regarding his desire to
appeal. Id. at 654. The court noted that "Strickland is a rule of general applicability
which asks whether counsel's conduct was objectively reasonable and conformed to
professional norms based 'on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel's conduct.'" Id. at 655 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (emphasis supplied by the Third Circuit)). The court also recognized that
Strickland "'provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claims.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)). The
Third Circuit also relied on Justice Kennedy's conclusion that "'[i]f the rule in question is
one which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can
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tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications
themselves create a new rule.5" Id. (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)),
As in Lewis, Rojas-Martinez's application of the Strickland standard did not
announce a "new" rule. The Stricklandtwo-part standard for evaluating counsel's
performance was announced in 1984, long before petitioner's conviction became final in
2000. See Sfrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). In Rojas-Martinez, this
Court merely applied the Strickland standard to counsel's advice regarding the
deportation consequences of a guilty plea. See 2003 UT App 203 at <[flj 6, 10 (recognizing
that Strickland governed the issue, and holding that counsel's advice amounted to
deficient performance under Strickland's first prong). Rojas-Martinez }s application of
Strickland did not announce a new rule, rather it "merely clarified the law as it applied to
the particular facts of that case." See Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655, Consequently, RojasMartinez did not announce a "new" rule.
This conclusion is supported by language in Rojas-Martinez itself. This Court
observed that it was merely adopting "a commonly recognized exception" to the rule that
an attorney need not inform his client of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.
2003 UT App 203 at ^f 8 (emphasis added). In fact, nearly five years before petitioner
pled guilty, this Court recognized in State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 n.3 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994), that some courts had held that defense counsel performs deficiently by
affirmatively misrepresenting the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. However,
this Court did not adopt the "affirmative misrepresentation" rule because McFadden's
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counsel gave no advice regarding deportation, and therefore the issue was not properly
before the Court. See id. Nevertheless, this Court did not state, or even imply, that Utah
would never adopt the "affirmative misrepresentation" rule. See id.
Petitioner acknowledged below that he could have relied on McFadden's footnote
to assert this claim in 1999. In his memorandum supporting his petition he stated,
"[g]ranted [petitioner] could have forged a new road back in 1999 by arguing in the
evidentiary hearing that the dicta in McFadden, should be adopted as law in Utah, but
failure to create precedent should not bar relief under the [PCRA]." R. 30. On the
contrary, petitioner's failure to raise the generally-applicable Strickland standard, and
seek the benefit of a "commonly recognized" exception that this Court had previously
acknowledged, does indeed preclude his current claim. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 5a106(l)(c) (barring relief on any claim that "could have been but was not raised at trial or
on appeal").
Petitioner argues that "the adoption of the collateral consequences doctrine in
McFadden meant that affirmative misadvice on the deportation consequences of pleading
guilty probably did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." Aplt. Br. at 39
(emphasis added). This argument misconstrues McFadden. This Court did not suggest
that an affirmative misrepresentation could not satisfy Strickland's deficient performance
prong. If anything, this Court's acknowledgement of the "affirmative misrepresentation"
exception in a case in which the exception was clearly inapplicable, suggested that the
Court would be willing to adopt the exception in an appropriate case. See McFadden,
884 P.2dat 1305 n.3. History supports this conclusion. This Court adopted the
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"affirmative misrepresentation" exception to McFadden 's rule in the first case in which it
had the opportunity. See Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203 at \ 8.
Petitioner also argues that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule because it was a
case of first impression. Aplt. Br. at 37. However, cases of first impression do not
necessarily announce new rules. As discussed above, a case does not announce a new
rule when it applies a generally applicable standard to a new set of facts. See Lewis, 359
F.3d at 655; Wright, 505 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Otherwise, an
appellate court would announce a new rule every time it applied a generally applicable
standard—such as Strickland, or the standards governing search and seizure law—to a
new set of facts. Rojas-Martinez was a case of first impression because it involved a set
of facts never before analyzed by a Utah appellate court. However, it did not announce a
new rule because it relied on the generally applicable and well-established Strickland
standard to evaluate those facts. See id,
"[Rojas-Martinez's] application of the Strickland standard was dictated by
precedent and merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular facts of that case."
Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655. Therefore, Rojas-Martinez did not announce a new rule.
Because petitioner did not seek the benefit of a new rule, and made no other attempt to
satisfy the interests of justice exception, the postconviction court correctly concluded that
the "interests of justice" did not excuse petitioner's untimely filing. R. 241.
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B. Even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule that
should apply retroactively, petitioner failed to allege a violation
of that rule.
1. Petitioner did not allege that his counsel affirmatively
misrepresented the deportation consequences of his plea.
Assuming arguendo that Rojas-Martinez announced a new rule that should apply
retroactively, the postconviction court correctly dismissed the petition because petitioner
failed to allege a violation of that rule. Petitioner alleged that his counsel affirmatively
misadvised him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea because counsel told
him that he "'might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure." R. 33 (a copy of
petitioner's affidavit is attached as Addendum D); 240. The postconviction court
correctly found that this was not an affirmative misrepresentation. R. 241.
Counsel's advice represented nothing, other than that counsel "was not sure" what
the deportation consequences of petitioner's plea might be. R. 33; 240. Counsel's
statement was the equivalent of saying "I don't know." Such a reply makes no
representation, let alone an "affirmative misrepresentation" about possible deportation
consequences.
Petitioner argues that there is a fact issue regarding whether counsel said "You
might be deported, but I don't know," or simply, "You might be deported." Aplt. Br. at
33. Petitioner asserts that, although his affidavit stated that his counsel told him he might
be deported but counsel was not sure, his wife's affidavit stated that counsel merely said
that petitioner might be deported. Aplt. Br. at 33; R. 33 (petitioner's affidavit), 36 (wife's
affidavit) (a copy of this affidavit is attached as Addendum E). Petitioner's attempt to
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create a factual issue by comparing two different affidavits that he submitted in support
of his petition is unavailing.
Petitioner misrepresents the contents of his wife's affidavit. Petitioner's wife
avers that "[she] was present on June 30, 1999 when Mr. Galvez told [petitioner] that
[petitioner] 'might' be deported for pleading guilty...." R. 36. Unlike the statement in
petitioner's affidavit, petitioner's wife never represented that she was asserting her
recollection of the advice that counsel gave petitioner. At best, the statement merely
establishes that petitioner's wife was present when petitioner asked his counsel about the
possibility of deportation. Moreover, petitioner's wife never stated that defense counsel
did not also state that he "was not sure" what the deportation consequences of petitioner's
plea would be. R. 35-36.
As the postconviction court recognized, petitioner had an opportunity in his
petition, and his affidavit, to allege his best recollection of his counsel's advice. R. 245:
26. That recollection was that his counsel told him that "he 'might be deported,' but that
[counsel] wasn't sure." R. 240. As the postconviction court correctly concluded, this
represents nothing other than that counsel was not sure what the deportation
consequences could be.
Petitioner now attempts to clarify that his counsel really meant "that [petitioner]
might be deported, but that [counsel] was unsure as to whether [petitioner] would actually
be deported." Aplt. Br. at 34. Although petitioner may now allege that this is what he
understood his counsel to mean, it does not change the substance of counsel's actual
advice. Petitioner's opportunity to allege the facts supporting his claims was when he
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drafted, with the assistance of counsel, his petition and affidavit. The facts he alleged did
not establish an affirmative misrepresentation.
In sum, even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new retroactive rule, the
postconviction court correctly dismissed the petition because petitioner failed to allege a
violation of that rule.
2. Petitioner cannot establish prejudice.
As explained above, even assuming that counsel affirmatively misrepresented the
deportation consequences of petitioner's plea, petitioner cannot establish prejudice. The
record of petitioner's criminal case establishes that although he knew that he would be
deported, petitioner never sought to withdraw his plea on that basis, and even requested
that the trial court facilitate his deportation by allowing him to be released early to the
INS. R. 147. Given those facts, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 22, 95 P.3d 276 (quotations and
citations omitted). Therefore, petitioner's claim ultimately fails for lack of prejudice.
II. PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A NEW RULE IS
UNPRESERVED; IN ANY EVENT, A COURT CANNOT
ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDING; EVEN IF IT COULD,
PETITIONER HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS
COURT SHOULD OVERRULE ITS PRIOR PRECEDENT AND
ADOPT THE MINORITY RULE
Petitioner asks this Court to overrule its prior precedent and join the minority of
jurisdictions by adopting a new rule requiring defense counsel to always advise
defendants of the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea (the "always
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advise" rule). Aplt. Br. at 9-32. This Court should not consider the merits of this claim
because it is unpreserved and petitioner has not argued that "plain error" occurred or
"exceptional circumstances" exist. Even absent petitioner's waiver, this Court should not
consider the merits of this claim because petitioner cannot seek the announcement of a
new rule for the first time in a proceeding under the PCRA. In any event, petitioner has
not demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent and adopt the always
advise rule. Nor can petitioner demonstrate prejudice under this rule.
A. This Court should not consider petitioner's claim because it is
unpreserved and he has not argued that any exception to the
preservation rule should apply.
Petitioner's request for the announcement of a new rule is unpreserved because he
did not raise this issue below. Petitioner argues that he preserved this claim during oral
argument on the State's motion to dismiss, when he asserted that defense counsel have
"an affirmative duty" to inform defendants about the immigration consequences of their
pleas. Aplt. Br. at 1 (citing R. 245:18) (a copy of the transcript of the argument on the
State's motion to dismiss is included as Addendum C). Petitioner did not preserve this
issue by merely alluding to it during oral argument on the State's motion to dismiss.
"Tn order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'" 438
Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting Brookside Mobile
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14, 48 P.3d 968) (additional citation
omitted)). "For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and
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(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority.'" Id. (alterations in original).
Petitioner did not give the postconviction court an opportunity to rule on this issue.
Petitioner has been represented by counsel throughout his postconviction proceeding.
Petitioner never alleged in his petition, or his memorandum supporting his petition, that
the postconviction court should disregard this Court's prior precedent and adopt a new
rule requiring defense counsel to affirmatively advise defendants of the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea. R. 6, 22-31. Rather, petitioner's only claim was that his
counsel was ineffective under this Court's holding in State v. Rojas-Martinez, because he
"affirmatively misrepresented" the immigration consequences of petitioner's guilty plea.
R. 26-30. Moreover, petitioner never moved to amend his petition to allege the claim that
he now raises.
At oral argument on the State's motion to dismiss, petitioner's counsel affirmed
that he was relying on Rojas-Martinez and proceeding under the theory that counsel had
"affirmatively misrepresented" the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. R. 245:
9-10, 20-22. Counsel argued, "Rojas-Martinez did announce a new rule ... [that] should
be applied retroactively to save [petitioner's] case." R. 245: 9-10.
It was not until the postconviction court questioned whether the alleged advice
even fit within the definition of an "affirmative misrepresentation" that petitioner's
counsel suggested that trial counsel had an affirmative duty to fully advise of deportation
consequences. R. 245:17-18. The postconviction court asked petitioner's counsel
whether an attorney "affirmatively misrepresents" the deportation consequences of a plea
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if, when asked whether the plea will render the client deportable, the attorney simply
responds, "I don't know." R. 245: 17. At that point, petitioner's counsel argued, for the
first time, that trial counsel has "a duty to provide that information" when asked. R. 245:
17.
When the postconviction court asked counsel how he could assert that such an
affirmative duty existed in light of this Court's holding in Rojas-Martinez, counsel
responded, "I get that from Rojas-Martinez because Rojas-Martinez says, 'you might or
might not be deported.'" R. 245: 17. Petitioner's counsel also argued that the ABA
standards for criminal justice require defense counsel to advise a client who wishes to
plead guilty of the possible collateral consequences. R. 245: 19-20.
Counsel reaffirmed, however, that he was grounding his argument in RojasMartinez. R. 245: 20-22. After quoting extensively from Rojas-Martinez, counsel
explained, "by not providing [a defendant] with that information, you have affirmatively
misstated the law." R. 245: 22 (emphasis added).
Although counsel alluded to this new argument below, he never raised the issue
with sufficient specificity to allow the postconviction court to rule on it. See 438 Main
Street, 2004 UT 72 at ^| 51. As the above discussion illustrates, counsel never clearly
articulated the claim he now raises. Rather, counsel alluded to this claim as an
afterthought, in response to the postconviction court's concern that petitioner's
allegations did not allege an affirmative misrepresentation.
Moreover, petitioner's counsel did not provide the postconviction court with any
of the authority that he now presents this Court. Petitioner never acknowledged below
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that his proposed new rule is directly contrary to this Court's controlling precedent
holding that "counsel's performance is not deficient by the mere failure to apprise a
noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty plea might subject defendant to deportation."
State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT
App 203 at Tf 7. Counsel never provided the postconviction court with any authority that
would justify ignoring this controlling precedent.
In sum, although petitioner alluded to his claim during the hearing on the State's
motion to dismiss, he did not raise it specifically, nor did he provide any legal support for
his claim. Petitioner did not present this claim "in such a way that the [postconviction]
court had an opportunity to rule on th[e] issue"; therefore, the claim is unpreserved. See
438 Main Street, 2004 UT 72 at lj 51.
This Court should not consider this unpreserved claim. "'Under ordinary
circumstances, [Utah courts] will not consider an issue brought for the first time on
appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist."
State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting State v. NelsonWaggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 16, 94 P.3d 186). "When aparty seeks review of an
unpreserved [issue], [Utah courts] require that the party articulate an appropriate
justification for appellate review." Id. (citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5
(Utah 1995)). Utah courts "have also required the party seeking appellate review in such
a situation to articulate the justification for review in the party's opening brief." Id.
(citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, If 9, 17 P.3d 1122). Petitioner does not assert
that "plain error" occurred, nor that "exceptional circumstances" exist. Consequently,
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this Court should not review his unpreserved claim. See id. (refusing to consider an
unpreserved issue "[b]ecause Pinder has failed to argue plain error or show exceptional
circumstances on appeal").
B. The PCRA does not allow a petitioner to seek the announcement
of a new rule.
The PCRA allows a petitioner to seek relief on five grounds. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-104(l) (West 2004). None of those grounds allows a petitioner to seek
the announcement of a new rule for the first time in postconviction proceedings. See id.
A petitioner is entitled to relief under the PCRA on the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence.
Id.
A petitioner could not claim that a proposed new rule of constitutional law would
entitle him to relief under subsections (a) through (c), allowing a petitioner to challenge
an unconstitutional conviction or unlawful sentence, because such a claim would be
procedurally barred. If a defendant believes that a new rule is constitutionally required,
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then that defendant can raise that claim in his criminal trial. The PCRA precludes relief
on any ground that "could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Therefore, a petitioner cannot argue, for the first time in
a collateral proceeding under the PCRA, that a court should announce a new rule of
constitutional law. See id.
Nor would subsection (d), providing for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, allow petitioner to seek the announcement of a new rule in a postconviction
proceeding. As explained above, a court must assess counsel's performance based on the
law in effect at the time. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (U.S. 2003)
(explaining that counsel's challenged conduct must be evaluated '"from counsel's
perspective at the time'") (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984));
see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993) ("To establish a claim of
ineffectiveness based on an oversight... a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's
performance was deficient"). Because counsel's performance is evaluated based on that
law that was in effect at the time of trial, a petitioner could not claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue that a court should announce a new rule of constitutional
law. See Murray v. Carrier, All U.S. 478, 486 (1986) ("[T]he constitution guarantees
criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure that
defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim").
Finally, a petitioner could not use subsection (e), providing for a claim based on
newly discovered evidence, to seek the announcement of a new rule. By its own terms,
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subsection (e) only applies to claims based on "newly discovered material evidence."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-104(l)(e).

As discussed above, the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek the benefit of a new
retroactive rule of constitutional law that is announced in a case decided after his
conviction became final. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). The PCRA provides
that "[t]he question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced
by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after
the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal
principles of retroactivity." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-104(2). However, this provision
applies only to a rule announced in a case that is decided "after the petitioner's
conviction became final." Id. (emphasis added). This provision does not allow a
petitioner to seek a new rule for the first time in a proceeding under the PCRA.
No ground for relief under the PCRA would allow petitioner to seek the
announcement of a new rule of constitutional law for the first time in a postconviction
proceeding. Therefore, even if petitioner had preserved this issue below, it does not state
a claim for relief under the PCRA.
C. In any event, this Court should not overrule its prior holdings
that follow the majority rule, and adopt the minority rule.
Even assuming that petitioner could raise this claim under the PCRA, he has not
demonstrated that this Court should adopt the always advise rule. Before petitioner can
persuade this Court to adopt his rule, petitioner must convince this Court that it should
overrule its prior holding in State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App.
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1994), which this Court reaffirmed in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, f 8, 73
P.3d 967. In both of these cases this Court recognized that "counsel's performance is not
deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty plea
might subject defendant to deportation." McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305; see also RojasMartinez, 2003 UT App 203 at 17 (reaffirming this rule).
To demonstrate that this Court should overrule these prior decisions, petitioner
must demonstrate that the decisions are "'clearly erroneous or conditions have changed
so as to render the prior decision[s] inapplicable.'" State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399
(Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Dungan, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (1986)). Petitioner has not
satisfied either requirement.
Petitioner has not shown that this Court's prior decisions were "clearly erroneous."
In McFadden, this Court "follow[ed] the majority rule ... that counsel's performance is
not deficient by the mere failure to apprise a noncitizen defendant that entry of a guilty
plea might subject defendant to deportation." 884 P.2d at 1305. This rule remains the
"overwhelming majority" rule, even after the amendments to federal immigration law
that petitioner cites. See State v. Zarate, 651 N.W.2d 215, 222 (Neb. 2002) ("The
overwhelming majority of courts ... have held that... failure to advise the defendant of
the possibility of deportation does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"). A
rule that has been adopted by an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions cannot be
"clearly erroneous." See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. Petitioner fails to demonstrate
otherwise.
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Nor has petitioner shown that "conditions have changed so as to render the prior
decision[s] inapplicable." See id. Federal immigration laws are indeed more strict than
when this Court decided McFadden. But they are not more strict than when this Court
decided Rojas-Martinez. In that case, this Court reaffirmed McFadden even after
acknowledging the changes to federal immigration law. See 2003 UT App 203 at f 7.
Moreover, whatever policy reasons may support petitioner's proposed rule,
petitioner fails to demonstrate that the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution
requires defense counsel to advise defendants regarding collateral deportation
consequences.1 The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the effective assistance of
counsel in "criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST, amend. VI. This guarantee "does not
extend to collateral aspects of the prosecution." Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357,
1358 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.
1989)); see also, In re: Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1184 (Cal. 2001) ("We are not persuaded
that the Sixth Amendment imposes a blanket obligation on defense counsel... to
investigate immigration consequences or research immigration law").
Changes in immigration law have not transformed deportation from a collateral to
a direct consequence of a guilty plea. In fact, petitioner does not even argue that
deportation should now be considered a direct consequence of a plea. As this Court held

1

Petitioner relies exclusively on the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 11. Because petitioner does not raise a separate argument
under the Utah Constitution, this Court should consider only his federal claim. See State
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage
in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state
and federal constitutions is briefed").
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in McFadden, "[a] collateral consequence is one that is not related to the length or nature
of the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea." 884 P.2d at 1304 (citing Kincade v.
United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3 rd Cir. 1977)). The Tenth Circuit has defined a
"collateral consequence" as one which "'remains beyond the control and responsibility of
the district court in which that conviction was entered.'" Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d
1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 (1 st Cir.
2000)). Whether a defendant will be deported is determined by a judicial system and
body of laws completely separate and distinct from Utah's criminal justice system, and
over which Utah authorities lack any control. "State courts have no more control over
whether a criminal defendant will be deported today than they did prior to the 1996
[amendments to federal immigration law]. Accordingly, deportation remains a collateral
consequence of a criminal conviction." Id. at 1257.
Because deportation remains a collateral consequence, petitioner has failed to
show that the Sixth Amendment requires this Court to adopt the rule he proposes.
Therefore, even assuming that petitioner could proceed on this issue, he has not
demonstrated that this Court should overrule its prior precedent and adopt the minority
rule he proposes.
D. Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice even under his
proposed new rule.
Even assuming that this Court should adopt the always advise rule, and that
petitioner's counsel was deficient under this new rule, petitioner cannot establish
prejudice. As explained above, petitioner cannot demonstrate a "reasonable probability
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that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 22, 95 P.3d 276 (quotations and
citations omitted). Therefore, petitioner's claim ultimately fails for lack of prejudice.
III. PETITIONER PROVIDES NO CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
OR ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE "INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION IS SATISFIED WHENEVER A
PETITIONER ASSERTS A MERITORIOUS CLAIM
Petitioner argues that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has developed [a] meritorious
claim exception to the [PCRA's] statute of limitations through the 'interests of justice'
exception." Aplt. Br. at 46. Relying entirely on the Utah Supreme Court's holdings in
Julian v. State and Frausto v. State, petitioner argues that a postconviction petition "may
only be dismissed if it fails to raise a meritorious claim." Aplt. Br. at 45. Petitioner's
claim fails because Julian and Frausto do not establish that the allegation of a
meritorious claim satisfies the "interests of justice" exception. Petitioner fails to offer
any other reason why this Court should interpret the "interests of justice" exception as he
proposes. In any event, as explained above, neither of petitioner's claims are meritorious
A. Neither Julian nor Frausto supports petitioner's interpretation
of the "interests of justice" exception.
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the "interests of justice" exception in
Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), does not control, because Julian was not a
proceeding under the PCRA; rather it was a proceeding seeking common law
"extraordinary relief... pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
The constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations, and the meaning of
the "interests of justice" exception, is currently before the Utah Supreme Court in Adams
v. State, 20040722-SC. The State's brief of appellee in that case is due 6 April 2004.
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at 250. Julian filed his petition in 1995, prior to the enactment of the PCRA. See id.
Therefore, the PCRA did not control.
Although the Supreme Court cited the PCRA's statute of limitations (section 783 5a-107) in Julian, it noted that the statute that the lower court relied on was actually the
former section 78-12-31.1. See id. at 251 n.4. This section was amended and
renumbered as section 78-35a-107 when the PCRA was enacted. See id.; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-107. Because Julian's petition was filed before the PCRA was even
enacted, section 78-12-31.1, not the PCRA's statute of limitations, was at issue. See id.
The distinction between the two statutes is significant.
Section 78-12-31.1 placed a one-year statute of limitations on petitions "pursuant
to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-31.1 (1995).
As noted, a petition under this rule sought relief in the form of a common law
extraordinary writ. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 250.
In contrast, the PCRA "replaced prior post-conviction remedies with a statutory,
'substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense.'" Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, If 4, 52 P.3d 1168 (quoting UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-102)). Therefore, the PCRA replaced the common law collateral review
at issue in Julian, with a statutory legal remedy.
Common law extraordinary remedies are fundamentally different from statutory
legal remedies. In fact, they are mutually exclusive. See, e.g., State v. Gee, 514 P.2d
809, 811 (Utah 1973) (holding that Gee was not entitled to extraordinary relief in the
form of a writ of error coram nobis because the Legislature had provided a legal remedy).
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"[I]t is only when the defendant is wholly without remedy that the common law provides
one." Id. Consequently, language interpreting a statute of limitations that restricted
access to a common law extraordinary writ, is inapplicable to a statute of limitations that
restricts access to a statutory legal remedy.
Relying on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029,
1033-34 (Utah 1989), petitioner argues that a petition under the PCRA is the modern
equivalent of a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus.
Aplt. Br. at 46. In Hurst, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta that "the writ of habeas
corpus has ... absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a single constitutional
remedy." 777 P.2d at 1033. However, the postconviction remedy that the Utah Supreme
Court contemplated in Hurst was not the remedy provided by the PCRA. The PCRA was
not enacted until 1996, nearly seven years after Hurst was decided. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-101 (West 2004). Therefore, Hurst does not establish that language
interpreting restrictions on a common law remedy also governs restrictions on the
PCRA's legal remedy.
Petitioner also notes that he is serving an increased sentence for aggravated reentry
of a previously removed alien based on the state conviction he challenges. Aplt. Br. at
46. However, petitioner fails to explain how that fact makes Julian's language
interpreting restrictions on a common law remedy applicable to restrictions on the
PCRA's legal remedy.
A petition under the PCRA is not simply a writ of habeas corpus brought under a
new label. Therefore, Julian's interpretation of the "interests of justice" exception in the
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prior section 78-12-31.1, limiting a common law extraordinary remedy, does not apply to
the PCRA's section 78-35a-107, limiting a statutory legal remedy.
Nor does Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), control the interpretation of
the "interests of justice" exception. Less than two months after Julian, the Utah Supreme
Court had the opportunity to directly address the PCRA's statute of limitations in
Frausto. See id. at 850. When the Julian author repeated his interpretation that the
"interests of justice" exception precluded time-barring any meritorious claim, only one
justice joined in that opinion. See id. at 851, 852. The three remaining justices concurred
only in the result: a remand to consider the "interests of justice" exception. Id. at 852.
Therefore, Frausto's plurality opinion does not control.
Other than relying on Julian and Frausto, petitioner presents no analysis or
authority explaining why this Court should now adopt the interpretation of the "interests
of justice" exception that he proposes. Aplt. Br. at 45-48. Therefore, his claim fails.
See, e.g., State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, Tf 61 n.7, 57 P.3d 977 (declining to adopt a state
constitutional rule in a capital case where Honie failed to demonstrate in any "meaningful
fashion" how the state constitution should be interpreted to reach that result).
B. Alternatively, petitioner has not alleged a meritorious claim.
Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the "interests of justice" exception is
satisfied when a petitioner asserts a meritorious claim, petitioner fails to satisfy the
exception. As explained above, even assuming that Rojas-Martinez announced a new
rule, petitioner has not alleged a meritorious claim because he did not allege that his
counsel affirmatively misrepresented the deportation consequences of his plea.
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Furthermore, petitioner's claim seeking the announcement of the always advise rule lacks
merit because the claim is unpreserved, and, in any event, the PCRA does not allow him
to pursue such a claim. Even assuming that petitioner could demonstrate that his counsel
performed deficiently under either rule petitioner proposes, he cannot demonstrate
prejudice. Therefore, even under his interpretation, petitioner has not satisfied the
interests of justice exception because neither of his claim are meritorious.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal of the untimely petition.

Respectfully submitted

/

April 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on

\

April 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two accurate

copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
Rob A. Justman
136 South Main Street, Suite A-200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Addendum A

U.S. CONST, amend. VI.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the assistance of
counsel for his defence."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-104 (West 2004) Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of

rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was
revoked in an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that
was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.

(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah
Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-106 (West 2004) Preclusion of relief—Exception

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-35a-107 (West 2004) Statute of limitations for postconviction

relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction
over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ
of certiorari is filed;

(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of
certiorari is filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
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FILED IKSTWCT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT \ 9 2004
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CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
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Attorneys for Respondent State of Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SERGIO LLAMAS-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,

I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY,1

Case No. 040909928
Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Respondent.

This matter came before the Court on 17 September 2004 for argument on the State's motion
to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was not present but appeared through
counsel, Rick Lundell. The State appeared through counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher
D. Ballard. The Court has reviewed the petition, the State's motion to dismiss, the memoranda filed
in support of and in opposition to the motion, and has also heard argument from both parties. Now

1

Petitioner mistakenly listed the Salt Lake County District Attorney as the Respondent. The
only proper respondent is the State of Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h) (Where a post-conviction
petition "is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the State of Utah
represented by the Attorney General."

being fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order dismissing the petition.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Petitioner was sentenced on 14 February 2000.
2. He did not file an appeal.
3. The last day he could have filed a notice of appeal was 15 March 2000. See Utah R. App.
P. 4(a).
4. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(2)(c), petitioner's post-conviction cause of
action accrued 15 March 2000, and expired one year later on 15 March 2001.
5. Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on 13 May 2004.
6. Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his counsel provided
ineffective assistance that adversely affected his guilty plea when counsel advised him that if he pled
guilty he '"might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure."
7. Petitioner contends that pursuant to section 78-3 5a-107(3), the "interests of justice"
exception should excuse his untimely filing because his claim is based on the court of appeals'
opinion in State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2003 UT App 203, 73 P.3d 967. According to petitioner, RojasMartinez announced a new rule governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to advice
about the immigration consequences of guilty pleas. Petitioner also contends that this new rule
should apply retroactively to his case.
8. Petitioner does not allege any other reason why the "interests of justice" should excuse his
untimely filing.

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The petition is untimely pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002). The PostConviction Remedies Act's statute of limitations expired on 15 March 2001 and petitioner did not
file his petition until 13 May 2004. Therefore, petitioner can only proceed if he can satisfy the
"interests of justice" exception found in section 78-3 5a-107(3).
2. Petitioner fails, however, to satisfy the "interests of justice" exception.
3. Contrary to petitioner's claim, Rojas-Martinez did not announce new rule. As the court of
appeals recognized, Rojas-Martinez merely adopted "a commonly recognized exception to the rule"
that an attorney's failure to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 2003 UT App 203 at ^ 8 (emphasis added).
4. In any event, even if Rojas-Martinez did announce a new rule that should be applied
retroactively, petitioner has not alleged a violation of that rule. Counsel's advice that petitioner
'"might be deported' but that [counsel] was not sure," did not affirmatively misrepresent the
immigration consequences of petitioner's guilty plea. Therefore, counsel's advise in this case is
distinguishable from the advice given in Rojas-Martinez.
5. Whereas petitioner does not allege any other basis upon which this Court could find that
the "interests of justice" should excuse his late filing, he fails to satisfy the exception.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court enters the
following:

3

ORDER
1. The State's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is GRANTED.
2. The petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED /f

October 2004.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Rick S. Lundell
Counsel for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 27 September 20041 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION, to Rick S. Lundell, Brian K. Lofgren, LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.C, 136 South Main,
Suite A-200, Salt Lake City, UT 84101, and further certify that as of 14 October 20041 have
received no response.

Christopher D. Ballard
Assistant Attorney General
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on September 17, 2004)

3

THE COURT: Sergio Llamas Rodriguez versus, I guess,

4

State of Utah. Let's start by having you state your appearances

5

please.

6
7

MR. BALLARD: Christopher Ballard on behalf of the
s~ate of Utah.

8
9

MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor, Rick Lundell on behalf of
Sergio Llamas, and this is my law clerk.

10

THE COURT: All right.

Okay, we're here on the State's

11

motion to dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief in this

12

case.

13

way I thought the briefs on both sides were very good and I

14

appreciate them.

I've read everything that's been submitted, and by the

15

Where is the petitioner?

MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor he's —

he's in Farmington

16

jail.

He's an illegal re-entry (inaudible) so he's —

17

has —

right now is he has a federal trial and this is pending

18

sentencing for the (inaudible) case.

19
20

THE COURT: Why didn't we get him transported for this
hearing?

21

MR. LUNDELL: You know it's a civil hearing and whether

22

—

23

necessarily consider it essential to our arguments.

24
25

what he

I mean if he wants (inaudible) record of it but I didn't

THE COURT: I see, so he has —
originally and then he re-entered.

he was deported

What effect would this
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petition have on his incarceration?

2

MR. LUNDELL: About two or three years.

3

THE COURT: He would remain incarcerated regardless of

4

whether this —

5

MR. LUNDELL: Yes, your Honor. In federal law or

6

federal sentencing guidelines if you're illegal re-entry they

7

have the (inaudible) the guidelines, it's a two tier approach.
The first tier has a base level. The base level of

8
9

re-entry is an eight then it's a sixteen point enhancement for

10

his particular crime, this particular underlying crime, so he's

11

looking at a twenty-four point right now and then he has —

12

there's another tier, it's a second (inaudible) so now he has

13

—

14

sixty-point enhancement and then they also use the same type of

15

criminal history.

well they use the same crime to give the enhancement the

16

So the possible criminal history and a possible

17

(inaudible).

18

serving.

So it's dramatic in terms of how much time he is

THE COURT: But he would serve time regardless of what

19
20

and

happened

in the conviction of this?
MR. LUNDELL: Oh, yes. He's already — we had our

21
22

federal trial, your Honor. Obviously it's pretty difficult to

23

win an illegal re-entry case when your client's sitting there

24

next to you.

25

70 days .

We lost and he has s entencing in approximately

The sentencing will take into account obvious ly his
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2

prior crime and that's where he gets the enhancement.
THE COURT: All right.

Well, let me give you what my

3

tentative thoughts are in this case.

The basis for the motion

4

to dismiss a statute of limitations in a state, of course,

5

relies on the one-year statute of limitations and the Post

6

Conviction Relief Act and this petition is clearly filed

7

outside the one-year, so what we're really dealing with is the

8

interest of justice exception to that.

9

The petitioner claims in this case that under Julian,

10

sbatue of limitations can never be constitutionally applied on

11

a writ of habeas corpus and that's really based upon the Julian

12

case and let me talk about how I read that case.

13

What the Julian case says, and I'm reading from page 9

14

based on my copy which is a lexis copy of the case is that, "If

15

the proper showing is made the mere passage of time can never

16

justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of

17

fundamental rights regardless of how difficult it may be to re-

18

prosecute that individual."

19

It goes on to say, "This does not mean that a

20

petitioner has an unconditional right to have his petition

21

considered fully on the merits.

22

petitioner has a right to have the claims set forth in his

23

petition reviewed by a judge for determination as to whether

24

the petition warrants further proceedings or whether it should

25

be dismissed for reasons set forth and Utah rules of civil

It means only that the
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2

procedure governing petitions for extraordinary relief.
If a statute of limitations alone could be applied to

3

dismiss such a new petition a person who has spent years in

4

prison who could show his innocence by new DNA evidence or

5

confessions of others can never be exonerated and obtain

6

freedom from wrongful incarceration."

7

That language which is really dicta in the case I

8

think applies really only to a person who is incarcerated on

9

the conviction that we're talking about.

10

If the petition for post conviction relief is in the

11

form of a writ of habeas corpus, in other words if you grant

12

the petition, the person is released from custody, then I think

13

that those principles apply.

14
15
16

But I think that the interest of justice exception is
kind of a sliding scale.
It doesn't take much in terms of the interest of

17

justice if the person is incarcerated on the conviction but

18

on the other hand if the person is not incarcerated on the

19

conviction we're talking about, I think the petitioner has to

20

come forward with a greater showing of interest of justice in

21

order to be relieved from the statute of limitations.

22

Now in this case I don't think that the petitioner has

23

made that showing of the interest of justice.

24

based upon the case of state of Utah vs. Rojas Martinez.

25

The petition is

In that case the petitioner or the defendant in that
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case was affirmatively misrepresented by his counsel the

2

immigration consequences of his plea.

3

In that case the counsel said that if he entered a

4

guilty plea to the charge that was contemplated, he might or

5

he might not be deported which the Court of Appeals found to be

6

a misrepresentation because it was absolutely clear under the

7

circumstances that if the plea was entered the defendant would

8

be deported.

9

That is not the case that we have here.

In this case

10

the petitioner, and I'm going to cite from his affidavit said

11

that he was told by Mr. Galvez —

12

might be deported but that he was not sure.'7

13

statement falls short of an affirmative representation about

14

the immigration consequences of a plea.

"Mr. Galvez told me that I
I think that

15

The lawyer's really simply saying that the fact of

16

deportation is a risk but that he doesn't know, and I think

17

that that falls within the McFadden rule of a simple failure

18

to advise of the immigration consequences of the plea.

19

The immigration consequences are not misrepresented.

20

The lawyer simply says he doesn't know which is like the same

21

as saying nothing at all about the immigration consequences of

22

a plea.

23

The other basis for finding the interest of justice

24

ir this case, even if Rojas Martinez apply was that it's a new

25

rule and that isn't what Rojas Martinez says about the rule
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that it's announcing.

2

recognized exception to this rule which is the rule of

3

collateral consequences when a terminee affirmatively mis-

4

represents deportation consequences to his or her client.

5

They view it as a commonly recognized exception to the

6

collateral consequences rule.

7

It says, "That it is a commonly

So for those reasons, I don't think that a case has

8

been made out that relief from this conviction would be in

9

the interest of justice.

10

tentative ruling.

11

chance to change my mind.

12

Having said all that is by way of

I'll hear from Mr. Lundell and give you a

MR. LUNDELL: Thank you, your Honor.

I appreciate

13

that.

14

These are all the cases that —

15

reply on the part of our presentation today. I feel a little

16

uncomfortable up here and, your Honor, please, if I start to

17

speak to quickly or mumble my words please remind me.

18

a tendency to start speaking kind of quickly and excited.

19

If I may approach I have established (inaudible) cases.
of —

and we've included in our

I have

Your Honor, I appreciate your position in that the

20

timeliness in terms that you have someone who's incarcerated

21

and their habeas is based on that incarceration.

22

Our case is very similar to that, your Honor.

Our

23

case where, in this situation our client has been deported and

24

he will continue or he must stay out of the country obviously

25

after he serves his time in the fed —

in a -- at prison,

1

whatever his time may be, we're looking at a range of, you

2

know, approximately 25 to, you know, but honestly it's more of

3

a 46 to a 53 month period.

4

In particular with an underlying conviction, this

5

one in particular, it does augment his sentence by double

6

approximately.

7

He would otherwise serve maybe even 12 months.

In addition, your Honor, if this petition was —

if

8

the motion to dismiss was denied and we were able to go forward

9

on a merits hearing we would be able to put Senior Galvez on

10

the stand and I would request an evidentiary hearing because

11

obviously this is based on affidavits and what I would call

12

limited memory as well as Mr. Galvez will have limited memory

13 I I'm sure, selective limited —

selective limited memory.

14

However it will allow us to move forward and to really

15

determine what was told to my client.

16

If we are able to meet our —

well, I'm going to back

17

up.

18

overcome the statute of limitations and we're able to

19

substantiate that this was a patent and this advice an

20

ineffective system counsel we —

21

we could reopen his immigration case.

22

If we were able to show in the interest of justice and

and get this judgment vacated,

By opening his immigration case he at one point I will

23

actually be able —

he was a lawful permanent resident at one

24

point in time.

25

novo on this case based on new evidence.

We can reopen his immigration case and start de
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He does have two American children here, a wife, a

2

house and this is his life.

3

very similar to the case that you propose and effected this

4

actual underlying conviction is what will keep him from ever

5

being with his family because he knows this is the best place,

6

the United States for his kids and for his wife and he would

7

make the conscious choice of never coming back again just so

8

they could have that luxury.

9

So I would strongly argue this is

Going into my argument we could see that the State

10

when I filed my petition, my client's petition, you know,

11

interesting as to —

12

it directly under the —

13

applied retroactively.

14

that completely, but we were able to, thanks to opposing

15

counsel, he was able to bring it back around and really

16

responded appropriately, I believe.

17

—

and I probably should have initially filed
under whether the rule should be
That's personally my error;

I missed

The State conceded in it's memorandum that if we could

18

show that Sergio Llamas' case was in the four corners of Rojas

19

with the mis-advice exception that it would qualify or it would

20

raise to the threshold of the interest of justice and satisfy

21

the statute of limitations or step outside the statute of

22

limitations.

23

Your Honor, Rojas Martinez did announce a new rule and

24

this is why.

I'm going to back up and say, in announcing the

25

new rule and, too, this rule should be applied retroactively to
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save his case and interesting enough I believe that this case

2

will be determined or should be determined on whether or not

3

this Court decides to apply the federal guidelines to —

4

federal rule to retroactivity or the state of Utah's Supreme

5

Courts.

6

or the

If you decide to go with the State's suggestion of

7

federal then I believe they will win.

8

the Supreme Court of this state then I believe that Sergio, my

9

client, should win.

10

If you decide to go with

Interesting enough, your Honor, the state of Utah is

11

silent on this issue as to what is a new rule.

12

research we did not necessarily find a Teeg analysis that would

13

demonstrate how this State determines what is a new rule,

14

totally silent.

15

In all of our

The Supreme Court has established a new rule but it's

16

kind of —

it's like they almost sidestepped any sort of

—

17

they didn't show the math, your Honor, and the two cases in

18

particular are actually with the board of pardons that I'm

19

referring to and the state of Utah necessarily just steps away

20

from what is determined or what could be determined a new rule.

21

Because it is silent on that I believe that we can and

22

should go to federal law for some sort of guidance and this is

23

sclely, your Honor, just to determine what is a new rule,

24
25

Your Honor, under Teeg it states that "A new rule is
determined by surveying

the legal landscape,"

and I'm sure
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you've read this, your Honor, and I will move along quickly,

2

"survey a legal landscape as it then existed and determine

3

whether a state Court would have felt compelled by existing

4

precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by

5

the constitution."

6

The Teeg definition of what a new rule is really not a

7

good definition.

8

case, your Honor, the United State Supreme Court is merely

9

setting the standard for retroactivity and pretty much brushes

10

First because in the Teeg —

in the Teeg

over what is or should be deemed a new rule.

11

It's not until we get to Lambrix, and I'm hoping I

12

pronounciate that correctly, L-a-m-b-r-i-x, the Lambrix case,

13

that the Supreme Court finally addresses as to what should be

14

determined a new rule and Lambrix states that "After survey of

15

the legal landscape whether the new rule was dictated by then

16

existing president and apparent to all reasonable jurists," and

17

this is real interesting, the language is very strong here,

18

your Honor, with Lambrix it says, and I'm going to back up

19

(inaudible), "After a survey," and this is how you determine

20

if this is a new rule, "After a survey of the legal landscape

21

whether the new rule is dictated by then existing president

22 J and apparent to all reasonable jurists," basically saying, your
23 I Honor, is if there is binding precedent or if it's apparent to
24
25 I

all reasonable jurists you don't have a new rule,
However, where there is —

excuse me and this is even
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stronger, it goes where there is no other interpretation, no

2

other interpretation is reasonable.

3

Your Honor, the Court in Rojas Martinez itself stated

4

this as a question of first impression.

It had not decided

5

this question.

6

basically stood for a majority of what the districts held and

7

that was that there is no affirmative duty —

We had McFadden, of course, and McFadden just

no affirmative

8 j duty to notify your client of the threat of consequences.
9

And only, your Honor, only in dicta does the state of

10 — 11

does McFadden refer to affirmative misrepresentations; so at

this point in time, your Honor, there is no rule.

12

In fact, your Honor, at this point in time if we want

13

to survey the legal landscape, and I appreciate opposing

14

counsel having done some research here for us because I want to

15

address this issue.

16

Opposing Counsel in his reply memorandum to ours

17

states that a survey of a legal landscape at the time

18

petitioner's conviction became final in 1999 demonstrates

19

—

20

Martinez would have been apparent to all reasonable jurists.

21

and this is from his writing that the holding of Rojas

By 1999 only three federal circuit courts of appeal,

22

five federal district courts and four states had recognized

23

that Counsel's affirmative misrepresentation of the immigration

24

consequences of a guilty plea may constitute ineffective

25

assistance of Counsel.
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Now this is some interesting language here, your

2

Honor, and kudos to opposing Counsel for having treaded lightly

3

here because this is what the facts are.

4

Again at least three federal circuit courts of appeal

5

as he states —

well, we know we have thirteen so three of

6

thirteen according to opposing Counsel, according to the state

7

I should call them, the government, only three of thirteen

8

have even addressed this issue that the district courts, five

9

federal district courts, I believe there's about approximately

10

200 had addressed this issue and four states out of 50 has

11

addressed this issue.

12

But it*gets even more interesting, your Honor, because

13

the cases that the government cites, the State cites in

14

particular the United States vs. Campbell dicta Counsel's

15

affirmative (inaudible) provide a case list for your Honor,

16

Counsel's affirmative misrepresentation in response to a

17

specific inquiry from the defendant may however under certain

18

circumstances costed ineffective assistance of Counsel.

19

In fact let me back up here.

Your Honor, United

20

States vs. Campbell mentions this in dicta and it hasn't held

21

it, so it might be there and this was according to the survey

22

of 1999 what was available to my client in terms of relief for

23

this sort of misrepresentation.

24
25

Two, United States vs. Russell, it's the government in
this situation, your Honor, that is misrepresented, the plea,

-14the consequences of the plea.
attorney.

Not his own —

not his own

This shouldn't even be included.
United States vs. Santos Leese denying petitioner

it says alleging petitioner —

—

petitioner alleging ineffective

assistance of Counsel because it did not allege affirmative
misstatement of pleas consequences.
Again, your Honor, this is not beholding of United
States vs. Santos Leese as dicta once again.
(inaudible) they're on point here.

United States

Counsel's affirmative

misrepresentation regarding the deportation of consequences of
a guilty plea is unreasonable under prevailing professional
norms .
The United States vs. Mora Gomez, they're still
undecided.

They're saying we don't know.

We're split.

We

don't know whether or not an affirmative misrepresentation is
ineffective assistance of Counsel.
Chabora vs. United States, in the absence of an
affirmative misrepresentation Counsel's (inaudible) form a
defendant of the immigration consequences of the plea does not
amount to ineffective assistance of Counsel dicta.
Most, of course, treat a lawyer's affirmative
misrepresentations in response —

I'm sorry this is also

United Sates vs. George, most courts treat a lawyer's
affirmative misrepresentation response to a specific inquiry
from an alien

client has at least potentially qualified for
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ineffective assistance treatment depending on all of the

2

circumstances.

3

Again, your Honor, dicta.

There are certain nuances here, your Honor, and this

4

is I think where we will definitely disagree with the State and

5

I definitely take a different stance than your position.

6

Once —

and —

well, let me get through this and then

7

I'll hit that point.

Villa Venda vs. State, Florida Court of

8

Appeals deny the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of

9

Counsel, but recognizing that the situation might be different

10

if the attorney made affirmative misrepresentations about the

11

defendant's future immigration status.

12

dicta.

13

Again, your Honor,

People vs. Correll now this is the one case that's

14

solid and it says in view of the erroneous and misleading

15

advice on the crucial consequence of deportation the defendants

16

plea of guilty were not intelligent and knowingly made and

17

therefore were not voluntary.

18

This case held this, your Honor, saying that it

19

must be unequivocal —

20

position you are making, if you are —

21

further, it says no, you will not be deported if you plead

22

guilty.

23

assistance of Counsel.

24
25

it must be —

and this is I think the
well this goes a step

This is one of those cases, yes, that is ineffective

Again, your Hon —
time line.

I just want to bring us back to the

This is back when my client was pleading guilty to
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this case, to this charge.

2

down as State vs. Williams, the State says it is our firm

3

belief that the consequences of deportation, whether labeled

4

collateral or not is of sufficient seriousness that it

5

constitutes ineffective assistance of attorney to fail to

6

advise a non-citizen defendant of the deportation consequences

7

of a guilty plea.

8
9
10
11

Williams vs. State, or I have it

Your Honor, this isn't even on point as to affirmative
iris-advice and I'm going somewhere with this because I'm going
to bring this full circle.
And then your Honor, in re Washington State says, "An

12

affirmative," this is again and I'm —

13

stated, "An affirmative misrepresentation to a defendant

14

regarding a possibility of deportation might constitute," might

15

constitute, "a manifest in justice and has provided a base for

16

setting aside a guilty plea."

17

holding that we have to —

18

this is what they've

That, your Honor, is the closest

most likely to Rojas Martinez.

Then the State goes on to actually mention that two

19

older cases and you've read this and I won't spend too much

20

time on it, they held that a guilty plea was valid even if

21

Counsel did misinform the consequences of immigration.

22

However, your Honor, also the law stated, your Honor,

23

that the exception that you're referring to is not always an

24

exception and I would dare think —

25

are going to say that there's an exception to a rule that it

I would dare say that if we
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would —

2

that it would be prevailing.

However, your Honor

THE COURT: Well, the real —

I mean the real issue

3

that I have in this case is whether he falls within Rojas

4

Martinez.

5
6
7

MR. LUNDELL: And that's —

and that's what I'm going

to quickly address here.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question.

8

If Mr. Galdez had simply said when he was asked about the

9

immigration consequences, "I don't know,"

10
11

—

does that fall

within Rojas Martinez?
MR. LUNDELL: Your Honor, it's —

one second.

No, your

12

Honor, it actually —

13

asks their attorney what their immigration consequences are, at

14

that point in time there is a duty to provide that information.

15

For example

it actually if —

if he asks, if anyone

—

16

THE COURT: Where do you get that from Rojas Martinez?

17

MR. LUNDELL: I get that from Rojas Martinez because

18
19

Rojas Martinez says, "You might or might not be deported."
THE COURT: Which they took as an affirmative

20

misrepresentation.

21

their view of that language was that it misrepresented the

22

immigration consequences because it sounded like there was a

23

chance he would not be deported, that it was optional and

24

because deportation was mandatory to say "Might or might not,"

25

misrepresented the State of the law.

I could have argued it either way but

But if he says, I don't

-181
2

know."

That's not a misrepresentation.
MR. LUNDELL: Well, actually —

I see your point there

3

your Honor an n I don't know" is not a misrepresentation but

4

at that point in time there's an affirmative duty for him to

5

provide the client

6

—

THE COURT: Okay, if that's the rule that if a client

7

asks that it's ineffective assistance of Counsel not to provide

8

the information, you've got to give me authority for that.

9

It's got to be in Rojas Martinez.

10

MR. LUNDELL: Okay —

11

THE COURT: Because I don't think it goes that far.

12
13
14

let me grab my

—
I

think it's limited to where you misrepresent.
MR. LUNDELL: Well, and I think we're —
now, your Honor because whether

it's word play

—

15

THE COURT: But these are significant because

—

16

MR. LUNDELL: They are —-

17

THE COURT: We're talking about the difference between

18

telling somebody something that's wrong and saying, "I don't

19

know," and it comes down to the words that were spoken.

20

MR. LUNDELL: True and that —

21

rry point exactly.

22

affirmative misrepresentation of the law.

23

There is a —

but this —- that was

the rule, your Honor, is an

There are cases out there that have held that —

and

24

the language is interesting because I don't necessarily see a

25

clear distinction between might or might not versus might but
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I'm not sure.

2

That's the exact same message to your client in

3

particular when you're —

4

when you're representing them and you're representing them in a

5

plea bargain which very well could be an aggravated felon and a

6

felony which would have him deported immediately mandatory for

7

the rest of their lives.

8
9

let me back up on that, in particular

Let me back up on an issue there because, your Honor,
actually you raised a great point and I want to address this

10

and I see where you're hanging your hat, your Honor, and I

11

appreciate that.

12

I've actually read the case to be but I see your position on

13

it.

14

why I've read it to be so broad, your Honor.

I've actually —

and it's interesting because

I've read the case to be a little bit broader but this is

15

Under the ABS standards of criminal justice

—

16

THE COURT: You're reading from Rojas Martinez?

17

MR. LUNDELL: No, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

19

MR. LUNDELL: Okay.

Go ahead.
Under the ABS standards —

and I

20

will come back —

I will come back to Rojas Martinez because

21

this is where I tie it in.

22

explicitly require defense counsel to explore collateral

23

consequences with a client as part of representation and a

24

guilty plea.

25

14-3.20 explains, "To the extent possible defense counsel

ABS standards for criminal justice

This is standard 14-3.20, well actually standard
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should determine and advise the defendant sufficiently in

2

advance of the entry of any plea as to the possible collateral

3

consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated

4

plea."

5

Now this is how it ties into Rojas Martinez, your

6

Honor.

Rojas Martinez —

7

this is an issue I'll raise later on —

8

concerned about the procedural bar that the State brought up

9

later on at the end of their brief, but Rojas Martinez refers
let me go there —

and it's funny because I had —

and

I was actually more

10

to —

refers to INS (inaudible) and it's

11

granted, your Honor, it's footnote No. 3.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. LUNDELL: Do you have Rojas Martinez before you,

14

vour Honor?

15

THE COURT: I do.

16

MR. LUNDELL: It's beginning on page 970, footnote

17

No. 3.

18

exception we conclude that an affirmative misrepresentation by

19

Counsel as to the deportation of consequences of a guilty plea

20

is today objectively unreasonable."

21

I'm going to read the sentence before thab. "Under this

This makes particular sense in light of the Supreme

22

Court's recent analysis in INS vs. (inaudible).

Citing the

23

amicus brief of the National Association of Criminal Offense

24

Lawyers, the Court noted that "Even if the defendant were not

25

initially aware, possible waiver of deportation of the
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immigration of Internationality Acts prior to 12-C," and I'll

2

come back and explain that, your Honor, "competent defense

3

counsel following the advice of numerous practice guides would

4

have advised him concerning the provisions of importance.'7

5

The Court also noted that the American Bar Association

6

standard for criminal justice provide that, "If a defendant

7

will face deportation as a result of conviction, defense

8

counsel should fully advise defendant of these consequences.

9

Further deportation, although collateral, is nonetheless a

10

drastic consequence/'

11

"In most cases this collateral consequence is more

12

severe than the penalty imposed by the court in response to

13

the plea.

14

misstatement on the matter represents an objectively

15

unreasonable deficiency."

16

Because of this, an attorney's affirmative

I'm reading this footnote and I read INS (inaudible),

17

your Honor, to impose obligations on an attorney that at

18

the moment that your client inquires as to the collateral

19

consequences of his immigration status in pleading guilty

20

you have an affirmative duty to provide him with an accurate

21

statement of the law, and if you don't you have effectively

22

you have effectively provided an affirmative misstatement of

23

the law, and this is why, your Honor.

24

There are charges out there.

25

There are —

where if

you are found guilty you will be deported as an aggravated

—
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felon and some of these charges are relatively simple; a

2

class A misdemeanor for 365 days.

3

with a 3rd degree felony, plead down, not know any better and at

4

the moment in time they would be deported.

5

Someone could be charged

Because, your Honor, because there is —

and I want to

6

come back to 2-12(c), at one point in time an aggravated felon

7

had relief from being deported under the 2-12(c) waiver but

8

that's been removed.

9

mandatory.

10

It is now immediate, imminent and

But by not providing them with that information, you

11

have affirmatively misstated the law, especially in particular

12

when they don't re —

13

to the consequences —

14

pleading guilty.

15

or when they request or they inquire as
the immigration consequences of them

And another point I wanted to point out, your Honor.

16

In many cases an affirmative misrepresentation runs the gamut.

17

It can be from —

18

might not or I

19

it can run from I don't know to might or

—

THE COURT: "I don't know" is never a misrepresentation

20

of the immigration consequences.

21

if a lawyer in fact does know

22

MR. LUNDELL: Uh-huh.

23

THE COURT: Simply not saying, but it's never a

24
25

misrepresentation.
MR. LUNDELL: Okay.

It may be a misrepresentation

—

-231

THE COURT: You can't tell me that.

2

MR. LUNDELL: Okay.

3

misrepresentation is a term of art.

4

exception, your Honor.

5

and most jurisdictions hold there is no duty to disclose any

6

consequences.

7

Well, an affirmative
That's what —

that is the

They're saying if there is no duty

—

An affirmative misrepresentation by Counsel is a term

8

of art meaning they're not going to necessarily change the

9

wording of affirmative misrepresentation to a quasi affirmative

10
11

misrepresentation.
It's a term of art and so to read such a —

to take

12

such a strict reading of what is an affirmative

13

misrepresentation as to might or might not versus being more

14

ambiguous as to he might but I'm not sure, is your not going

15

you can not necessarily change the wording of an affirmative

16

misrepresentation.

17

THE COURT: All right.

18

MR. BALLARD: Your Honor, just a procedural matter

Let me hear from Mr. Ballard.

19

before I begin with my argument.

20

petitioner has a right to be here at a dispositive hearing.

21

think Counsel has implicitly waived his appearance.

22

want to make that waiver explicit on the record.

23
24
25

The rules make it clear the

I just

THE COURT: I don't think that there's anything that
he can do.

—

I mean only the client can waive his appearance.

MR. BALLARD: Well, I believe Counsel could waive it

I
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for him.

2

THE COURT: I don't think so.

3

MR. BALLARD: Okay.

4

THE COURT: I think he should have been here.

5

MR. BALLARD: Well, in any event I think, your Honor

6
7

has correctly

—

THE COURT: Tell me if you think I'm wrong and I just

8

want your honest opinion about the difference between this case

9

and Rojas Martinez.

10

If I'm up in the night tell me so but it

doesn't seem to me that it's the same case.

11

MR. BALLARD: It isn't the same case and your Honor's

12

correctly analyzed that issue because saying, "I'm not sure,"

13

cr "I don't know," is not an affirmative misrepresentation and

14

as the Court pointed out in Rojas Martinez, there is not an

15

affirmative duty to advise your client of the collateral

16

consequences of a guilty plea.

17

Deportation is clearly collateral and in fact in Rojas

18

Martinez the Court of Appeals said, "An attorney's failure to

19

inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty

20

plea without more does not fall below an objective standard of

21

reasonables.

22

his attorney about the immigration consequences, the rule is

23

that you cannot affirmatively misrepresent and that is not what

24

happened in this case.

25

There's no affirmative duty.

If a client asks

But in any event this Court doesn't need to get into
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whether Rojas Martinez applies and whether a petitioner has

2

made out —

3

Rojas Martinez because Rojas Martinez doesn't apply here.

4

It's not a new rule that, your Honor has observed in Rojas

5

Martinez the Court recognized that this exception of —

6

affirmative misrepresentation it was a commonly recognized

7

exception and in fact, petitioner himself in his petition

8

admitted that he could have brought this claim at trial.

9

or whether a petitioner has made out a case under

Petitioner was on notice that there was an —

10

potential immigration issue.

11

don't know."

12

which is precisely what happened in this case.

13

for an

a

His trial counsel told him, "I

In effect saying consult an immigration attorney

Petitioner consulted an immigration attorney prior to

14

sentencing.

15

deported." and the petitioner proceeded on that basis rather

16

than raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at

17

that time or even in a timely petition for post conviction

18

relief, he proceeded knowing that he would be deported and in

19

fact asked the sentencing Court to release him to INS so he

20

could be deported.

21

The immigration attorney told him, "You will be

This is not a new rule that applies retroactively.

22

This was a rule that existed at the time the petitioner could

23

have taken advantage of and did not and for those reasons his

24

petition is untimely and even if this Court goes to the next

25

step of the analysis of whether Rojas Martinez does apply and
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petitioner has made out a case under Rojas Martinez he has not

2

because there is no affirmative misrepresentation here.

3

THE COURT: Well, the reason I think it's important

4

even to the statute of limitations is because of the interest

5

of justice exception and I think it's much harder to make out

6

interest of justice if he doesn't fall within Rojas Martinez.

7

That's my point.

8

MR. BALLARD: Exactly.

9

further questions the State (inaudible)

10

THE COURT: No other questions.

11

Unless the Court has any
—
Anything else

Mr. Lundell?

12

MR. LUNDELL: Yes, your Honor.

This is (inaudible)

13

Martinez right now is very premature.

14

Honor.

15

is possibly what he may —

16

don't have privy to all those conversations.

17

What —

I'll tell you why, your

and I understand your concern, but all we know
or what he did tell my client.

We

THE COURT: Well, we can look at his petition, his

18

affidavit and give him the benefit of every reasonable

19

inference from what he says.

20

into Rojas Martinez, then it seems to me that we can consider

21

that in determining whether or not interest of justice require

22

relief from the statute of limitations (inaudible).

23

He doesn't make out a claim

MR. LUNDELL: And this is my —

or this is what I think

24

would be fair, your Honor, is that we necessarily address the

25

issues because in an evidentiary hearing, your Honor, we could

-271

determine what really happened.

2

told, because I have (inaudible) Galvez on the stand.

3

very well that Galvez did tell my client that you might or

4

might not get deported.

5

I can only go and provide this Court with what my client has

6

told me which was, "you might, but I'm not sure," sort of

7

statement.

8
9

What —

everything that was
It's

But until I get him on the stand then

So I believe by going into —

I believe we've made a

prima facie meeting of Rojas Martinez but now we necessarily

10

need to look at whether or not there's a new rule and if it

11

should be retroactively applied assuming, of course, after the

12

evidentiary hearing that we have met that burden and we have

13

fallen squarely within Rojas Martinez.

14

There is a —

and I'm trying to remember Isom —

there

15

was —

16

I thought I'd included it with the petition but maybe I didn't

17

because I didn't include the petition.

18

to the Court on sentencing saying that if I plead, my attorney

19

says I might not get deported.

20

when Sergio Llamas was sentenced he submitted a letter.

He submitted a letter

Otherwise I will get deported.

I'm proffering that at this moment in time but in

21

terms of a motion to dismiss which is an awfully harsh, you

22

know, because it was a harsh remedy when we can actually go to

23

the merits of this case.

24

you know, that Galvez did misrepresent the law and

25

affirmatively misstated.

You know, it's very possible that,
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I

In fact according to that letter, your Honor, it does

2

-- his letter to the judge is that I've returned and I plan on

3

-- done so because if you let me do the —

4

sex offender program, I might not get deported, as his attorney

5

had advised him, which again is absolutely and completely

6

inaccurate and, your Honor, is a misstatement of the law.

7

THE COURT: All right.

I think it was the

Thank you.

I am going to grant

8

the motion to dismiss for the reasons I've already stated on

9

the record.

Mr. Ballard, prepare the order.

0

MR. BALLARD: (Inaudible).

1

THE COURT: We'll be in recess.

2

(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
SERGIO LLAMAS-RODRIGUEZ,
AFFIDAVIT OF SERGIO LLAMASRODRIGUEZ

Petitioner,

(In Support of Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief)

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,

Civil No.

Respondent.
Judge Anthony B. Quinn
(Criminal Case No. 981910089FS)
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Sergio Rodriguez-Llamas, the Petitioner of in the above-captioned matter, being at least
eighteen years of age and of sound mind, duly swear and state as follows:
1.

I entered the United States of America in or around 1987.

2.

Prior to my deportation in 2000,1 lived in the United States for a total of 13 years and I

worked at Albertson's North Salt Lake Distribution Center during the previous four years.

l

3.

My wife and I have two children. Both were born in the United States and are residents

of the State of Utah,
4.

My two children, Lilibeth and Sergio, are currently ages 16 and 14, respectively. Lilibeth

has been attending Tooele High School and Sergio is currently attending Tooele Junior High School.
5.

Prior to my deportation, I was active in my community and as a member of the Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
6.

Being present in the United States of America together with my family is the most

important part of my life.
7.

I have always considered the immigration consequences of any criminal activity to be the

most important part of being convicted of any such criminal activity, such as by a guilty plea.
8.

On May 29, 1998, charges were filed against me for "SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD"

pursuant to Utsih Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, a Second Degree Felony,
9.

I have, at all times prior to my plea in June of 1999, unequivocally maintained that I am

innocent of this charge.
10.

Prior to May 29, 1998,1 had no criminal history other than minor traffic violations.

11.

Prior to pleading guilty on June 30,1999,1 asked my attorney, Jorge Galvez whether I

would be deported if I were to plead guilty to the stepped-down chai'ge of "ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE
OF A CHILD."
12.

Mr. Galvez told me that I "might be deported" but that he was not sure.

13.

Mr. Galvez then told me that if I did not accept the plea bargain and the I lost at trial, that I

would go to prison for a period of up tofifteenyears and as a result, I would be separatedfrommy family.

2

14.

Mr. Galvez then told me that I did not have a good chance of winning at trial.

15.

Based on Mr. Galvez' legal advice that I accept the plea bargain to avoid going to prison and

to avoid separationfrommy family and his advice that I only "might" be deported, I plead guilty to
"ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD", a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 765-404.1.
16.

I would not have plead guilty to the foregoing criminal charge if I knew that I was

pleading guilty to an "aggravated felony" and that I would be subject to automatic deportation under
federal immigration law. Rather, I would have insisted on going to trial to prove my innocence.

C^&V*

($m*&^

Sergio Llamas
Subscribed and Sworn hereto before me this 7
Notary Public

ZENON SANTIAGO
-

^

.... ^

757 East Uftonbsc Avenue
Salt UkeCfty, Utah 84106
My Commission Expires
January 30, 2005

1
f

day of May, 2004.

-S-—-f
Signature of Notary Public

g

f

3

Addendum E

FILED DISTRICT G0USIT
Third Judicial District
MAY 1 3 2004
LUNDELL & LOFGREN, P.<'.
Rick S. Lundell (8848)
Brian K. Lofgren (8890)
136 South Main Street, Suite A-200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-4663
Facsimile: (801) 534-1559

By

m

SALT LAKE COUl

Deputy Clerk

Aliimios tor Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE C
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
SERGIO LLAMAS-RODRIGUEZ,
Al Ml) \ \ I i l W GOURDES LLAMAS

Petitioner,

(In Support of Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief)

VS.

Civil No,

SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNFY,

Judge A nthonj B. Quinn
(Criminal Case No. 981910089FS)

STATE OF UTAH
SS
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
( 1 O'linlcs i lamas, heiiw at least nijlilcni \t\ns of'ai'e and id -uiumd mind, duh

MUMI

nidi "ilalc as

follows:
1.
2
3.
4.

I a m the wife of Sergio I lamas-R odriguez ("Sergio"), the Petitioner in this matter.
Ve have two children, both born in the State of I Tiah in the United States of America.
..-. present each and every time Sergio met with his attorney,. Jorge Galvez.
Jntil June 30, 1999, Sergio has always maintained that he ^ as : \^ >, - * « . • '
1

"sex abuse of a child.".
5.

d

1 was present on June 30,1999 when Mr. Galvez told Sergio that Sergio "might" be

deported for pleading guilty to the charge of "ATTEMPTED SEX ABUSE OF A CHILD", a third
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1.
6.

Mr. Galvez told Sergio that Sergio did not have a good chance of winning at trial.

7.

Mr. Galvez also told Sergio that if Sergio did not accept the plea bargain and lost at trial,

that Sergio would go to prison for up tofifteenyears.
8.

1 would have never supported my husband pleading guilty to any criminal charge that is

considered an "'aggravated felony" under federal immigration law that would subject him to automatic
deportation.

tfsCU^
piqxrls $, rJA*

.

Lourdes Llamas

Subscribed and Sworn hereto before me this

7

day of May. 2004.

s e a * iMstta w a r t *prai7 wemui isssffi *3iS8S|

Notary Public
ZENON SANTIAGO
767 East Lfeonbeeteeaue
Salt Lake C%,Utah 84106

I
§

*
*

Signature of Notary Public

.ternary 3Qt 2005
(fgss o*4si p*tn* mtm MW» ( * r
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